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COMMENTS
AN END TO INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In May of 1968 a 27-year-old mentally defective deaf mute
with the mental ability of a pre-school child was arrested for the
robbery of nine dollars worth of property and money. Had he
been fortunate enough to be tried for his alleged crime, he might
have gone to jail for a few months or even been put on probation.
Instead, this defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and,
in the face of psychiatric testimony that his condition would not
improve, was committed to a mental institution until declared
competent. The trial court was presumably concerned that the
defendant should not have to stand trial when he was not men-
tally capable of defending himself. The alternative was to put
this 27-year-old man in a mental institution essentially for life.
The cure is far more onerous than the affliction.
Unfortunately this case is not so unusual as its atrocity would
lead one to hope. Statutes governing commitment of persons
found incompetent to stand trial exist in most jurisdictions.' Al-
though their justification is to protect defendants' due process
rights to a fair hearing, their effect is to incarcerate people in-
definitely on a psychiatrist's determination of their incompetency.
This comment first discusses the traditional rationale for the
status of incompetency to stand trial and the corruption of the
standard for incompetency into a tool to incarcerate undesirables.
Then the recent Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Indiana2 and
its effects on the present use of incompetency to stand trial are
explained. Finally, Justice Douglas' separate opinions in two
related cases, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution3 and Murel
v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,4 are compared to the Court's
position in Jackson, and their implications are explored.
INCOMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL-BEFORE JACKSON V. INDIANA
Historical Development
The notion of incompetency to stand trial was an extension
of the common law ban against trials in abstentia. The incom-
1. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 361 (F. Lindman & D. McIn-
tyre eds. 1961).
2. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See text accompanying notes 35-60, infra.
3. 407 U.S. 245 (1972). See text accompanying notes 61-70, infra.
4. 407 U.S. 355 (1972). See text accompanying notes 71-75, infra.
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petent defendant, although physically present, was thought to be
mentally absent.5 The theory was that, if the defendant were com-
petent, he might be able to present the court with some fact or
explanation which would lead to his acquittal.' Indeed the rule
was that an insane person could "neither plead to an arraignment,
be subjected to a trial, . . . receive judgment, or . . . undergo
punishment." 7
The underlying concern was with the fairness of the trial.
The due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
requires that the defendant must be in a position to present to the
court any exculpatory facts or arguments." Therefore, conviction
of an accused person while he is legally incompetent has been
held a violation of due process.9
The problem with the notion of incompetency to stand trial
is that the determination is not presently made for the salutary
purposes outlined above, nor do the effects of a finding of in-
competency comport with the expressed intention of protecting
the due process rights of the accused.
A frequently cited case illustrative of the extent to which in-
competency proceedings are misused is United States v. Barnes.'0
In that case, Clarence Coons was one of four defendants who were
determined to have been denied a speedy trial guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. This denial required that the charges against
them be dismissed, and they were dismissed as to three defend-
ants. However, Coons was committed as incompetent to stand
the "trial" of the dismissal hearing. A psychiatrist reported that
he was "presently insane and so mentally incompetent as to be
unable to understand the proceedings against him, or to properly
assist in his own defense."" The court admitted that there was
little for Coons to do to assist his counsel in the dismissal of his
case, but found that the test under the applicable statute 12 was
whether the defendant was insane or unable to understand the
proceedings or unable to assist counsel. The court stated that the
statute was intended to afford "some protection for society" as
5. Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defend-
ants, 108 U. PENN. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960).
6. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
7. Id. at 940. California has incorporated this common law rule into its
criminal statutes. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1367 (West 1970).
8. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT
OF THE COMMITrEE ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION
OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE TRIAL 15 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as D. C. REPORT].
9. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
10. 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
11. Id. at 65.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970).
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well as to preserve the rights of the accused. 3 Therefore, the
court ordered Coons committed until he became mentally compe-
tent to stand trial.
The determination of incompetency has become merely a
diagnosis by psychiatrists of the defendant's mental illness, and a
finding of incompetency has become a strategic weapon by which
persons are incarcerated indefinitely without a criminal conviction
or even a commitment under civil statutes. "[I]n attempting to
develop and practice a concept of fairness, due process in the ad-
ministration of justice, we have developed a practice which is a
denial of the very due process we are trying to emulate."' 4
The Standard for Incompetency
The standard by which incompetency to stand trial should be
judged has been set forth by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Dusky v. United States.'5
It is not enough . . . to find that the defendant is oriented to
time and place and has some recollection of events, but . . .
the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to-
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 16
Despite the fact that this standard is universally accepted
and has been incorporated into the statutory law of a number of
states,' 7 a finding of incompetency often turns on whether the de-
fendant is psychotic or should be hospitalized. 18 The courts defer
to psychiatric judgments regarding the defendant's "compe-
tency.""9 Psychiatrists in turn apply medical definitions of mental
illness rather than the legal standard in making their determina-
13. 175 F. Supp. at 65. Emphasis in original omitted.
14. Vann & Morganroth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the
Competence to Stand Trial, 43 U. DET. L.J. 1, 12 (1965).
15. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
16. Id.
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); CAL.
PEN. CODE §§ 1367-68 (West 1970). The California code sections refer to the
"insanity" of the defendant, but insanity in this context has been interpreted to
mean inability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to
aid counsel in conducting the defense. People v. Merkouris, 52 Cal. 2d 672, 678,
344 P.2d 1, 4 (1959).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 460 (1967-68).
19. Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. Civ. RIrrs-
Civ. LiB. L. REv. 379, 392 (1969). An empirical study in Michigan showed
that in 41 cases where the psychiatrists reported to the court that the persons
they examined were incompetent, the courts followed the psychiatrists' recom-
mendations in all but one case. Vann, Pretrial Determination and Judicial
Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Use of Psychiatric Information in the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 43 U. DET. L.J. 13, 22-23 (1965).
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tions.20 Even in those cases where psychiatrists make some at-
tempt to deal with the legal standard, records show that they tend
to confuse the standard for competency With that for criminal re-
sponsibility.21 Psychiatrists' reports to the court are either con-
clusionary on the issue of competency, lacking facts on the basis
of which a court might make an independent determination of
competency,22 or else are written in terms of psychiatric labels
which tell the court nothing regarding competency.28 Further-
more, once committed, patients are held until no longer "mentally
ill" rather than until competent to stand trial, the former period in
most cases being substantially longer than the later. 4 Thus, the
standard for a finding of incompetency has become not so much
a legal standard as a medical one, not so much concerned with
competency and understanding as with "mental illness" and the
psychiatrist's view of the desirability of hospitalization.
Incompetency to Stand Trial: Perversion of Purpose
Although the original rationale for a finding of incompe-
tency to stand trial was to protect the due process rights of an
incompetent defendant, little of that purpose seems to motivate
the present operation of the law.
Due process protection cannot logically justify denial of due
process plus denial of an accused's right to a speedy trial. Yet
this is exactly what is done through incompetency to stand trial
proceedings. A finding of incompetency in the United States re-
sults almost universally in commitment to a mental institution
through either mandatory commitment statutes"8 or judicial prac-
20. Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of an
Abused Doctrine, 1969 LAW & TI1P SOCIAL ORDER 233, 240.
21. Eizenstat, Mental COmpetency to Stand Trial, 4 H~kv. CiV. Rioirrs-
Civ. LIB. L. REv. 379, 389 (1969), citing a conclusion from the Michigan study
of Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Prob-
lems, 119 AM. J. PsYcH. 713 (1963).
22. For an example of such a c6ncluslonary psychiatric report, see, Whalem
v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 819 (D.C. Cit. 1965) (disetiting opinion by
Chief Judge Bazelon). A few cages, to be sure, have inquired into psychiatric
reports and have rejected them as founded on a misunderstanding of the standard
to be applied (United States v. Gundeifinger, 98 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D.
Penn. 1951) ) or as cOnclusionaty (Gitnther v. United Sttteg, 215 F.2d 493
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (opinion by Judge Bazelon again) ) and have required a
judicial determination as to competency. Such judicial assumption of duty is
unfortunately rare.
23. Vann, Pretrial Determination and Judicial Decision-Making: An Anal-
ysis of the Use of Psychiatric Information in the Administration of Crithinal
Justice, 43 U. DEt. L.J. 13, 15 (1965).
24. Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of ah
Abused Doctrine, 1969 LAW & THE SOCIAL ORDER 233, 241.
25. Commitment is mandated by AtitUtes in no lets than 39 states. THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 361 (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961).
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tice .2  Thus there are contradictory motivations involved: the
original incompetency rationale of sheltering the insane from the
severity of the criminal process conflicts with the desire to protect
society from those suspected of criminal behavior.27 The loose
standards for incompetency commitment can be and are manipu-
lated to accomplish the latter objective without having to meet
the burden of proof requirements for criminal convictions or the
often strict standards for civil commitment.
The report of the Judicial Conference of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit2" on this subject recognizes that such a practice
exists and deplores its use. For example, the report asserts that
the court in United States v. Barnes29 was influenced by the fact
that dismissal of the charges would have freed a defendant who
might be dangerous. The court, therefore, used a finding of in-
competency to stand trial for dismissal of charges as an alternative
to normal civil commitment procedures.8 0
Prosecutors and judges frequently use the issue of incompe-
tency as a means to accomplish preventive detention. Minor crim-
inal charges serve as a jurisdictional excuse for indefinite confine-
ment of undesirables." Sometimes the real motivation behind
an incompetency commitment is expressed overtly. For exam-
ple, it is the practice in some jurisdictions for the superintendent
of the psychiatric hospital, upon making a determination that a
patient has regained his competency to stand trial, to write to the
committing court and request that the patient be returned to the
court's jurisdiction. In one case where that procedure was fol-
lowed, the court responded: "After referring the above matter
to the district attorney, we were advised that their office does not
want this man back in the community. 382  A number of com-
mentators have reported similar attitudes of courts and prosecu-
tors. 3  Clearly, then, before Jackson v. Indiana, the status of in-
See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1370 (West 1970); D.C. CODE ENCYCLOPEDIA
§ 24-301(a) (1967); N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC. § 872 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
26. In a two year Michigan field study, every person found incompetent to
stand trial was committed to a state hospital for the mentally insane. Lewin,
Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of an Abused Doctrine,
1969 LAw & THE SOCIAL ORDER 233, 240-41.
27. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 472 (1967-
68).
28. D.C. REPORT, supra note 8.
29. 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959). See text accompanying notes 10-13,
supra.
30. D.C. REPORT, supra note 8, at 143.
31. Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the Law, 13 U. KAN.
L. REv. 59, 70-71 (1964-65).
32. Id. at 72.
33. See, e.g., McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for
Trial and Mental Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B. U. L. REv. 46, 47-49
[Vol. 13
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competent to stand trial was imposed on a defendant, not as a
means of protecting his due process right to a fair adjudication of
his guilt or innocence, but rather as a means to indefinitely com-
mit him while circumventing both a criminal trial and civil com-
mitment proceedings.
A TRILOGY OF MENTAL HEALTH DECISIONS-
JACKSON, McNEIL, MUREL
Jackson v. Indiana34
Theon Jackson, a 27-year-old mentally defective deaf mute
with the mental age of a pre-school child was prosecuted for rob-
bery" in a county criminal court in Indiana. Jackson pleaded not
guilty but the trial never reached the merits because the court
instituted proceedings under Indiana laws8 to determine Jackson's
competency to stand trial. The court appointed two psychiatrists
to examine Jackson and at a competency hearing received their
testimony plus that of a deaf school interpreter who had tried to
communicate with Jackson. According to these witnesses, Jack-
son's mental deficiency and almost total lack of communicative
ability made it impossible for him to understand the nature of the
charges against him or to participate in his defense. They also
testified that it was highly improbable that his condition would
ever improve. The court found Jackson incompetent and ordered
him committed to a mental institution until sane.
Jackson's counsel filed a motion for a new trial on the ground
(1969) referring specifically to the disposition of misdemeanants in Massachu-
setts courts; Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of
an Abused Doctrine, 1969 LAw & THE SOCIAL ORDER 233, 238; Eizenstat, Mental
Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 379, 380-81
(1969); Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and
Problems, 119 AM. J. PsycH. 713 (1963).
34. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
35. There were two offenses charged: 1) theft of a purse and its contents
worth four dollars; and 2) robbery of five dollars in money.
36. IND. CoDs 35-5-3-2 (1971), which reads in part:
When at any time before the trial of any criminal cause . . . the court
. has reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane,
he shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the question
of the defendant's sanity and shall appoint two . . . physicians who shall
examine the defendant upon the question of his sanity and testify con-
cerning the same at a hearing. . . . If the court shall find that the
defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the
criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make
his defense, the trial shall not be delayed . . . . If the court shall find
that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the
proceedings and make his defense, the court shall order the defendant
committed to . . . an appropriate psychiatric institution. Whenever the
defendant shall become sane the superintendent of the . . . hospital
shall certify that fact to the proper court, who shall enter an order . . .
directing the sheriff to return the defendant [to the court] ....
[H]e or she shall then be placed upon trial for the criminal offense ....
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that, because Jackson would never become competent to stand
trial, he was essentially being sentenced for life without ever hav-
ing been convicted of a crime. He was thereby deprived of his
fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection
and was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by
the eighth amendment. The trial court denied the motion and on
appeal the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed.8 7  The case came
to the Supreme Court of the United States on a grant of cer-
tiorari.18 The Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed on the
grounds that the defendant had been denied equal protection and
due process under the fourteenth amendment. These two impor-
tant bases for the decision deserve separate treatment.
Equal Protection. Jackson contended that he was denied
equal protection because he was subjected to a more lenient com-
mitment standard and more stringent standard of release than was
applied to persons not charged with criminal offenses. Jackson
was committed under a statute89 governing exclusively those found
incompetent to stand trial. Indiana has two other commitment
statutes, one governing commitment of the "feeble-minded"4 and
the other the "mentally ill." 1
To commit a person as "mentally ill," the state must show
that he suffers from mental illness, and is in need of "care, treat-
ment, training or detention." The state may also be required to
show that the person is dangerous.4 2  From the record it ap-
peared that Jackson could not be committed under this statute.
First, there was no showing that he was in need of custodial care
37. Jackson v. State, 253 Ind. 487, 255 N.E.2d 515 (1970).
38. 401 U.S. 973 (1971).
39. IND. CODE 35-5-3-2 (1971). A new system of numbering codes was
adopted by the Indiana legislature in 1971. All cites are to these new numbers
although the decision refers to the old numbers also.
40. IND. CODE 16-15-1-3 (1971). This section refers to commitment of
those who are feeble-minded but not insane. The term "feeble-minded" is not
therein defined, but IND. CODE 16-15-4-1 (1971) refers to citizens who are
"feeble-minded, and are therefore unable properly to care for themselves."
A feeble-minded person may be released from commitment at any time upon
determination by the hospital superintendent that his condition warrants it.
IND. CODE 16-15-4-12 (1971).
41. IND. CODE 16-14-9-1(1) (1971) and IND. CODE 16-14-9-9 to -18 (1971).
Section 16-14-9-1(1) defines a "mentally ill person" as one "who is afflicted
with a psychiatric disorder" and who "because of such ...disorder, requires
care, treatment, training or detention in the interest of the welfare of such
person or the welfare of others in the community. . . ." The other cited sec-
tions set forth a procedure for psychiatric examination and a judicial hearing
to determine insanity. Finally, a "mentally ill person" may be released at
the discretion of the hospital superintendent or when "cured of such illness."
IND. CODE 16-14-9-23 (1971).
42. IND. CODE 16-14-9-1(1) (1971). The Court sees a possible require-
ment of showing dangerousness in the language "[Dietention in the interest
of the welfare of such person or the welfare of others in the community ....
[Vol. 13
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or detention; 48 second, there was testimony that the state did not
have the facilities to provide treatment or training for Jackson's
condition; finally, there was no showing that he was dangerous.
To commit a person as being "feeble-minded," the state must show
that he is "unable properly to care for [himself].' 44 By contrast,
the state had to show only inability to stand trial in order to com-
mit Jackson. Furthermore, under an incompetency commitment,
one cannot be released until competent to stand trial,45 while both
the "feeble-minded" and the "mentally ill" may be released when
they no longer require custodial care or treatment .4  The Court
suggested that Jackson might meet the latter requirements for re-
lease immediately even without any improvement, although it ap-
peared quite unlikely that he could ever meet the competency
for trial requirement.1
7
Indiana applied different commitment standards to Jackson
solely because he had criminal charges pending against him. The
Court, relying on its decision Baxstrom v. Herold48 and citing sev-
eral consonant state and lower federal court decisions,40 found
the pendancy of criminal charges insufficient to justify different
commitment and release standards. 0 Baxstrom involved a state
prisoner who was civilly committed at the end of his prison sen-
tence without the right to a jury trial on the issue of competency;
the jury trial was available to all persons civilly committed except
those nearing the end of prison sentences. The Court held that
for the purpose of granting jury review of the question of whether
a person is mentally ill, "[T]here is no conceivable basis for dis-
tinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of
a penal term from all other civil commitments." 51  In Jackson,
the Court simply applied Baxstrom's reasoning to a pre-trial com-
mitment, saying: "If criminal conviction and imposition of sen-
tence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive
protection against indefinite commitment than that generally avail-
able to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot
43. 406 U.S. at 728. In fact, the opposite appeared to be true: Jackson
was perfectly capable of caring for himself.
44. IND. CODE 16-15-4-1 (1971). See note 40, supra.
45. See note 36, supra.
46. See notes 40 & 41, supra.
47. 406 U.S. at 729.
48. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
49. United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied 396 U.S. 847 (1969) (incompetency to stand trial); Common-
wealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 254 N.E.2d 779 (1969) (pending criminal
charges); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (insanity acquittal);
Humphrey v. Cady, 406 U.S. 504 (1972) (sex offenders).
50. 406 U.S. at 724.
51. 383 U.S. at 111-12.
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suffice. ' 52 Essentially the Court ruled that once a state provides
due process safeguards in its involuntary civil commitment pro-
ceedings, it cannot withhold those safeguards from persons who
come to involuntary commitment through criminal proceedings.
Due Process. Jackson's commitment was to continue until
such time as he was certified "sane"53 in the sense of being com-
petent to stand trial. 4  However, the evidence showed that Jack-
son would probably never be able to meet that standard; thus his
commitment was indefinite and most likely for life. However, if
Jackson's condition of incompetency to stand trial could not be im-
proved through custodial care and treatment and his commitment
were indefinite, then the whole rationale for his commitment
would fail. In light of this dilemma, the Court held that due proc-
ess requires that
a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial proba-
bility that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the
State must either institute the customary civil commitment
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any
other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if
it determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to
stand trial, his continued confinement must be justified by
progress toward that goal. 55
Incompetency commitments, then, must be both temporary and
effective in rehabilitating the defendant to competency or they
will be invalid.
The usual bases for the states' power to commit persons in-
definitely who are judged mentally ill are dangerousness to self,
dangerousness to others and the need for care, treatment or train-
ing.5 Indeed, these were the criteria invoked by Indiana statutes
for commitment of the "mentally ill'' 7 and "feeble-minded. '5 8 The
question of the due process sufficiency of these justifications for
involuntary commitment was not before the Court in Jackson.
On the one hand it appears that, by designating civil commitment
procedures as the standard which must be equaled in incompe-
52. 406 U.S. at 724.
53. IND. CODE 35-5-3-2 (1971) set out in note 36, supra.
54. 406 U.S. at 720, n.2.
55. Id. at 738.
56. Id. at 737; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and
Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1289-97 (1965-66).57. IND. CODE 16-14-9-1(1) (1971) set out in part in note 41, supra.58. IND. CODE 16-15-4-1 (1971) set out in part in note 40, supra.
[Vol. 13
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tency proceedings and by citing civil commitment as an alterna-
tive disposition of one who cannot regain competency to stand
trial in a reasonable time, the Court may be implying acceptance
of these criteria. 59 On the other hand, the Court's statement that
"[clonsidering number of persons affected, it is perhaps remark-
able that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power
have not been more frequently litigated"60 seems to indicate that,
although this decision turned on the narrow constitutional validity
of incompetency to stand trial proceedings, the Court may be
willing to scrutinize involuntary civil commitment proceedings for
constitutional validity in an appropriate case.
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution6'
Consideration of two other cases also decided by the Court
last term, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution and Murel v.
Baltimore City Criminal Court,62 is useful for a fuller understand-
ing of the Court's position and important for the implications of
Justice Douglas' separate opinions. The McNeil decision extends
the due process rationale in Jackson to misuse of temporary com-
mitment procedures in a post-conviction setting.
Edward McNeil was convicted of two assaults and sentenced
to a maximum of five years in prison. Instead of sending him to
prison, the trial court referred McNeil to Patuxent Institution for
examination to determine if he should be committed there for an
indefinite term under Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law. 3 Al-
though at the time of this decision McNeil had been in Patuxent
for six years, he had never been diagnosed a defective delinquent
because he refused to answer psychiatrists' questions and the doc-
tors insisted they could make no evaluation without his coopera-
59. See discussion of the Douglas opinions, text accompanying notes 99-
119, infra, for the opposite view.
60. 406 U.S. at 737.
61. 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
62. 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
63. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 31B (1971). This law provides that a person who
has been convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors may be committed to
Patuxent Institution indefinitely if a court determines that he is a "defective
delinquent". Id. § 9(b). A defective delinquent is defined as "an individual
who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal be-
havior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found to
have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both, as to
clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require . . . confine-
ment and treatment ...... Id. § 5. Upon initial commitment for examina-
tion, the institution psychiatrists are to evaluate the prisoner and make a report
to the court. Id. § 7(a). If the report recommends commitment, a hearing is
held with a jury trial, if the person so requests, to determine whether he
should be committed as a defective delinquent. id. § 8.
1973]
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tion. The state contended that McNeil could be held indefinitely
in this status until he cooperated.64
McNeil filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the
ground that, with the expiration of his prison sentence, the state
lost all power to hold him on a simple court order for examina-
tion. That order was based solely on an ex parte judicial deter-
mination that there was "reasonable cause to believe that the de-
fendant may be a defective delinquent." The trial court denied
relief and the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied leave to ap-
peal. The case came to the Supreme Court on a grant of cer-
tiorari. '
The Court found that McNeil's continued confinement was
a violation of due process 6 because it was in fact an indefinite
commitment 67 resting on procedures designed to authorize a short
period of observation. The Court observed that "lesser safe-
guards may be appropriate" where confinement is for a short
period and for a limited purpose, but conversely, where confine-
ment is by a procedure lacking important due process safeguards,
its duration must be very limited.6 8 Quoting from its decision in
Jackson v. Indiana the Court said "[D]ue process requires that
the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable re-
lation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."6 "
That is, due process does not permit a state to confine a person
indefinitely on the basis of an ex parte order for commitment for
observation and evaluation. The McNeil decision, then, is anal-
ogous to the due process rationale in Jackson in that both invali-
dated the use of temporary commitment procedures as a means
of confining people indefinitely." °
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court
The last of the trilogy of mental illness cases is significant
solely for the dissent by Justice Douglas. The majority opinion
in Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court was merely a dismissal
of a writ of certiorari on the ground that it was improvidently
granted.71 The case involved state prisoners who were convicted
64. 407 U.S. at 254-55, n.4 (concurring opinion by Douglas, J.).
65. 404 U.S. 999 (1971).
66. 407 U.S. at 249-50.
67. He had already been confined for six years and the Court found there
was "no reason to believe ...he will ever be released" or "will ever be easier
to examine than he is today." id. at 249-50.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 250 quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738.
70. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in this case is discussed in text
accompanying notes 101-109, infra.
71. The original grant of certiorari is reported at 404 U.S. 999 (1971).
The case is reported under different names in the lower courts. The United
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of various crimes, assessed fixed prison terms and then committed
to Patuxent Institution under Maryland's Defective Delinquency
Law. 72  The prisoners sought habeas corpus relief challenging the
criteria and procedures for their indefinite commitment on the
ground, inter alia, that the government should have been required
to prove that the prisoners were defective delinquents beyond a
reasonable doubt. 78
The Court dismissed the writ because one of the four peti-
tioning prisoners had been released and the other three were still
subject to fixed prison sentences which would bar their release
even if they prevailed on these issues. 74 In his dissent, Justice
Douglas agreed with the prisoners' assertion that they had been
denied due process protection because they were committed in-
definitely on only a fair preponderance of the evidence. 75  The
implications of that dissent will be discussed later.76
THE EFFECTS OF JACKSON V. INDIANA
The Supreme Court in Jackson ordered a halt to the use of
incompetency to stand trial proceedings as a means of indefinite
commitment. The Court held that a person committed solely be-
cause he was incompetent to proceed to trial could not be held
more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will soon be-
come competent. If he is not likely to regain competency quickly,
the state must either institute civil commitment proceedings or
else release him. Even if the defendant probably will rapidly re-
cover, his continued confinement must be justified by progressive
improvement.77
Clearly the Supreme Court left no room in the future for
indefinite commitments based on an adjudication solely of this
form of incompetency. Henceforth, incompetency commitments
must be brief and rehabilitatively successful or they will be held
unconstitutional. Thus, it will no longer be advantageous for the
prosecution or the court to raise the issue of incompetency against
the defendant's will. A finding of incompetency can no longer
be a means of indefinitely disposing of a case, of incarcerating a
person charged with a crime without meeting the proof require-
States District Court for the District of Maryland had denied relief, 295 F.
Supp. 389 (Md. 1969), sub nom. Sas v. Maryland, and the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit had affirmed, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), sub nom.
Tippett v. Maryland.
72. Set out in note 63, supra.
73. 407 U.S. at 356.
74. Id. at 357.
75. id. at 365.
76. See text accompanying notes 110-119, infra.
77. 406 U.S. at 738.
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ments of a criminal proceeding, or of circumventing civil commit-
ment.
Will the doctrine of incompetency to stand trial slip from
common practice into legal history? The Jackson limitations
make it now advantageous for the defense to plead incompetency
to stand trial. The defendant no longer faces the risk of indefinite
commitment and may, in a rare situation such as that of the Jack-
son case, be able to get off entirely as both not competent to stand
trial with little chance of improvement and also not within the
purview of the civil commitment statutes. However, in view of the
way incompetency determinations have been used to incarcerate
people previously, it is likely that courts will be very hestitant to
make a finding of incompetency, in all but the most extreme
cases, if the result would be complete release of the defendant.
The more likely result will be that great numbers of people, who
before Jackson would have been found incompetent and indefi-
nitely committed, will now stand trial. It is at least conceivable
that some of these people will actually be incompetent under a
true application of the Dusky standard.7 8 That is, they will not
be able to consult reasonably with their attorneys and will not
have a rational understanding of the trial proceedings. Two ques-
tions are raised: is such a result desirable, and is it constitu-
tional?
If an incompetent defendant were to stand trial, his interests
would be represented by his retained or appointed counsel rather
than by a prosecutor, judge or court-appointed psychiatrist.
Surely in view of the basic assumptions of our adversary system
and the sorry consequences to an incompetent of a pre-Jackson
non-adversary commitment, it will be to his advantage to stand
trial, even if arguably incompetent.
The constitutional question may be murkier. In Pate v. Rob-
inson, 9 the Supreme Court previously held that it was a denial
of due process to try a person while he is legally incompetent.8
On the other hand, the Court in Jackson81 referred favorably to a
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Myers v.
Briggs82 which held that a defendant, facing indefinite commit-
ment because of incompetency to stand trial with little chance of
becoming competent, should be given an opportunity to be tried
on the issue of guilt or else be released. 83 While such approval
78. See text accompanying notes 15-16, supra.
79. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
80. Id. at 377-78.
81. 406 U.S. at 736.
82. 46 111. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970).
83. Id. at 285, 263 N.E.2d at 113.
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by no means guarantees that the Court is ready to overrule Pate, at
lease it may indicate a willingness to consider the issue again.8 4
In those cases where a defendant is found incompetent to
stand trial, the Court makes clear that its prior decisions, such as
Pate, in no way prevent the states from allowing incompetent de-
fendants to raise some defenses, such as the insufficiency of the
indictment, and to make pre-trial motions through counsel if such
defenses and motions do not require the defendants' assistance."8
Such a procedure has been frequently suggested8" and success-
fully used.17
Thus incompetency to stand trial will be a much less fre-
quently invoked doctrine as a result of the Jackson decision and
more defendants will enjoy due process protections heretofore
strangely missing for those branded incompetent.
The effects of the Jackson decision will be widely felt. The
transition will be least difficult in the federal criminal system,
since a "rule of reasonableness" had been earlier read into the in-
competency commitment statutes"' by the lower courts.8 9 That
"rule" requires that commitment for incompetency to stand trial
under federal statutes must not be for an unreasonable or indefinite
period of time-essentially the due process holding of Jackson.
Changes in the state criminal systems will be more substan-
tial. For example, the California incompetency commitment pro-
visions are typical of those against which the Jackson decision
was directed. California Penal Code section 1370 requires that
upon finding the defendant insane,9" the court must order that
he be committed until he becomes sane. The statutory tests for
commitment and recovery in most states91 are similar to Cali-
84. It may be that the question will not be presented. If the issue of in-
competency is not raised at the trial level and the defendant is found guilty,
the defendant cannot then appeal on that ground. If the issue is raised below
and the defendant adjudged competent, a higher court will no doubt give great
deference to the trial court finding and therefore only reach the constitutional
issues if the trial court finding was patently wrong.
85. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 741.
86. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962);
D.C. REPORT, supra, note 8, at 143-44 (Recommendation 15).
87. United States v. Marino, 148 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Regina v.
Roberts, 2 Q.B. 329 (1954); contra, Regina v. Benyon, 2 Q.B. Ill (1957).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 4244, 4246 (1970).
89. See, e.g., Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) and
Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961). This rule was not af-
fected by the Supreme Court decision in Greenwood v. United States, 350
U.S. 366 (1956) which approved the indefinite commitment of an incompe-
tent federal criminal defendant, since that decision was based on an explicit
finding of dangerousness and not merely on defendant's incompetency.
90. Interpreted as "incompetent". See note 17, supra.
91. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 359-60 and chart 386-93 (F.
Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961).
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fornia's, and therefore, to the extent that the statutes are used
to commit people indefinitely, they violate due process guarantees
and must fall.9
2
The scattered statistics which exist on the number of persons
committed as incompetent to stand trial indicate that the Jackson
decision will have a dramatic impact on inmate population. For
example, the patient population of Matteawan State Hospital for
the criminally insane in New York was 2142 in November 1962.
Of these, 1167 or 54.5%, had been admitted as incompetent to
stand trial.98 By 1966 the Matteawan population had shrunk to838 patients, but 565 (68%) of them were committed for incom-petency. 94 Ionia State Hospital in Michigan had 1484 patients in
August, 1960; 755 or 57% of these were there because they were
held incompetent. 95
The length of time for which those found incompetent to
stand trial are held in mental institutions is even more shocking
and revealing than their number. The median9" stay at Mattea-
wan in 1965 was six to seven years as compared to four to eight
months in non-criminal mental institutions run by the State of New
York. 7 Similarly, the record for restoration to competency at
St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. shows a shocking
prolongation of the commitment period. 8 Thus, Jackson can
92. On February 7, 1973 the California Supreme Court did indeed find thatthe California statutes requiring commitment of persons found incompetent to
stand trial were unconstitutional under Jackson. Davis, Cowan & Palma v.State of California, Nos. 16512, 16513, 16530 (Cal. Feb. 7, 1973). The court
stated that "In view of the similarities between California and Indiana pro-
cedure, it seems evident that we must adopt . . . the rule of the Jackson case
that no person charged with a criminal offense and committed to state hospital
solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial may be so confined morethan a reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that he will recover that capacity in the foreseeable future.Unless such a showing of probable recovery is made within this period, de-fendant must either be released or recommitted under alternative commitment
procedures."
93. T. SZASZ, PSYCIAnUC JUSTICE 50 (1965).94. Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis ofConfinement of Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-criminals by the Department ofCorrection of the State of New York, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 651, 658 n.53(1967-68).
95. Comment, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competency to Stand Trial,
59 MICH. L. REV. 1078, n.4 (1961).
96. The median given is for all patients, of whom 68% were committed asincompetent. However, Matteawan patients include only misdemeanants andpersons with criminal sentences of one year or less. Morris, The Confusion ofConfinement Syndrome: An Analysis of Confinement of Mentally Ill Crimi-
nals and Ex-criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of New
York, 17 BUFF. L. REv. 651, 657 (1968).97. Id. at 656. Of 1654 patients, 703 had been there at least 10 years,306 at least 20 years, 119 at least 30 years, 29 at least 40 years, 4 at least 50
years and one for 64 years.
98. D.C. REPORT, supra, note 8, at 49. 53.8% of the patients took over
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mean a totally different life for some defendants unfortunate
enough to have been labeled incompetent to stand trial.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOUGLAS OPINIONS
Jackson v. Indiana is a highly laudable decision in that it
guaranteed to defendants found incompetent to stand trial at least
those due process safeguards found in civil commitment statutes.
But its virtues are also its shortcomings: the decision never went
beyond comparing incompetency commitment proceedings to civil
commitments, never designated criminal procedural safeguards as
the standard to be met.
Justice Douglas was the only member of the Court to ques-
tion that approach at least to some extent. He did that not in
the Jackson case, but in the two other mental health decisions
last term: McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,9 in which the
Court held that a person may not be incarcerated indefinitely on
a pre-trial commitment for psychiatric examination, and Murel v.
Baltimore City Criminal Court,10 ° in which the Court refused to
hear a challenge to Maryland's Defective Delinquency Laws.
In his concurring opinion in McNeil, Douglas argued that the
defendant was deprived of his fifth amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination because he was punished by indefinite deprivation
of his liberty for refusal to answer psychiatrists' questions.' 0 ' One
cannot reach such a conclusion without trampling on some cher-
ished assumptions in the law of involuntary commitment. It is a
central tenet that involuntary commitment must be distinguished
from criminal incarceration; commitment proceedings are not ad-
versary contests but are intended to determine what is best for
the defendant. Furthermore, psychiatrists are neutral experts who
necessarily recommend that disposition which is in the defend-
ant's best interests.
Douglas rejected both assumptions. Following the Gault 01
rationale that it is the deprivation of liberty which is determinative
of the procedural protections necessary, not the civil or criminal
label attached to the process, he argued that where one is under
threat of incarceration against his will in any institution, whatever
it is called, he is entitled to remain silent and not incriminate him-
self. 03 In short, such a proceeding is adversary and must be rec-
a year to be restored to competency, 22.7% took over 3 years, and 10.6%
took over 5 years.
99. 407 U.S. 245 (1972). See text accompanying notes 61-70, supra.
100. 407 U.S. 355 (1972). See text accompanying notes 71-75, supra.
101. 407 U.S. at 257.
102. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
103. 407 U.S. at 257.
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ognized as just that. Furthermore, a psychiatrist appointed by
the court to question the defendant regarding, among other mat-
ters, the crime charged, and who then makes a report which may
result in indefinite commitment of the defendant, is not a neutral
party. He represents a threat to the defendant's liberty; there-
fore, the defendant may refuse to answer his questions.104
Douglas is not alone in this view. 105 The judges of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit have recommended that no sanction be
imposed against an accused who refuses to participate in a pre-
trial mental examination and that he be advised in advance of his
right to withhold his cooperation. 10 They see such a practice as
necessary to preserve the defendant's privilege against self-incrim-
ination. They do not deal with whether that protection is tech-
nically applicable, but rather believe it is conceptually required.10 7
In addition, one study0 " attacked the assumption of the psychi-
atrist's neutral or benevolent position head on by asking a group
of psychiatrists who conducted pre-trial competency examinations
whose agent they considered themselves to be in making that ex-
amination. Three replied they were agents for the hospital direc-
tor, two said for the court, one was unsure, and one said he was
an agent for himself. None said they were the agent of "Science"
or made any similar neutral response. 09
Douglas' conclusions depart from those of the Court as a
whole because of his view that involuntary commitment must be
compared to criminal confinement. Both are deprivations of lib-
erty against the subject's will. Indeed they differ only in that one
is the result of specified overt criminal acts, whereas the other is
based on a psychiatrist's determination of present state of mind
and his prediction of future behavior.
In his Murel dissent, Douglas applied the analogy again and
said that "an individual's personal liberty is an interest of tran-
scending value for the deprivation of which the State must prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt."" 0  Furthermore, Douglas in-
terprets prior Supreme Court decisions as requiring this result. In
Speiser v. Randall,"' the Court characterized an individual's per-
sonal liberty as "an interest of transcending value"' "12 and as-
104. Id. at 256.
105. See, e.g., T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965).
106. D.C. REPORT, supra, note 8, at 93-94.
107. Id. at 95.
108. Vann & Morganroth, Psychiatrists and the Competence to Stand Trial,
42 U. DET. L.J. 75 (1964-65).
109. Id. at 83.
110. 407 U.S. at 365.
111. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
112. Id. at 525.
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serted that it is the rights at stake which must determine the pro-
cedural safeguards required.11 In In Re Gault,"4 the Court sim-
ilarly held that the civil or criminal label attached to the proceed-
ing must be ignored in favor of consideration of the rights in-
volved." 5  However, none of these earlier cases were concerned
with involuntary commitment of persons to mental institutions,
and the present cases suggest that only Douglas is willing to ex-
tend the precedent to reach them.
The effects of requiring proof of mental illness or danger-
ousness1 ' beyond a reasonable doubt are nothing short of revolu-
tionary. The science of psychiatry has not yet reached a level of
precision allowing accurate and consistent diagnosis of present
mental disorders" 7 let alone prediction of future behavior. One
commentator,"1 " after analyzing the few studies which had been
done following up psychiatric predictions of anti-social behavior,
concluded that psychiatrists are highly inaccurate in their predic-
tions. Furthermore, they tend toward one type of error--over-
prediction of dangerousness," 9 which results then in over-commit-
ting. It is evident that psychiatrists could not possibly determine
mental illness or predict dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since the prosecution and the court rely heavily, if not exclu-
sively, on psychiatric reports in determining whether to commit a
person, the heavy burden of proof is not likely to be met by other
means. Dangerousness could only be adequately demonstrated
if a person were shown to have already committed an act en-
dangering society, at which point he is very likely within the scope
of criminal sanctions. Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
for involuntary commitment would essentially eliminate the pos-
sibility of such commitment. That would mean that the mentally
ill could no longer be singled out for preventive detention on a
probably inaccurate prediction that they may be dangerous in the
future. Their status as mentally ill would be legally irrelevant;
they could be incarcerated only for criminal acts and only after
a trial with full procedural due process safeguards.
113. Id. at 520-21.
114. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
115. Id. at 50. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
116. S. BRAKET_ & R. ROCK, Tim MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 36
(1971). Many states' civil commitment statutes require a showing of danger-
ousness but the standard of proof is not "beyond a reasonable doubt."
117. Fuller, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: 1969
Style, 10 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 74, 88-89 (1969-70); Elliott, Procedures for
Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO.
L. REV. 231, 232 n.8 (1970-71).
118. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predic-
tions, 23 J. OF LEGAL EDu. 24 (1970).
119. Id. at 46.
1973]
578 SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 13
CONCLUSION
Jackson v. Indiana will substantially eliminate the status of
"incompetent to stand trial" if its mandates are applied. People
who might previously have been labeled incompetent and incar-
cerated indefinitely in a mental institution have, with this decision,
been brought within the reach of constitutional protections sup-
posedly available to all citizens.
Justice Douglas would extend those constitutional protections
to civil commitment proceedings and would eliminate coerced
confinement on the basis of mere psychiatric prediction. There
is no indication that the rest of the Court is presently willing to
follow Douglas' lead, but perhaps, as in the past, a dissenting
view will grow to be that of the majority in some future Court.
Marian Kennedy Pollack
